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Abstract
The paper discusses how asset managers are regulated in the UK in order to provide investor pro-
tection and market confidence. Fiduciary duties and the duty of care in the English common law,
statutory laws, the rules of the FCA, and other industry codes are examined to provide an explanation
of the UK regulatory approach to the asset management industry. The paper then discusses the extent
to which a legal transplant of the UK model to China may be feasible as the asset management industry
is currently being reformed inChina. Recommendations are made forChina todevelop an independent
asset management industry, to provide more investment outlets for investors, and to have effective
enforcement mechanisms of laws and rules to deliver market confidence and investor protection.
Keywords
Asset management, fiduciary duty, investor protection, shadow-banking, China
1. Introduction
The asset management industry has contributed significantly to the economy of the United King-
dom, for example through the management of large pension funds and other corporate activities
such as takeovers.1 The UK asset management industry is currently ranked the second largest in the
* School of Law, University of Exeter, Exeter, UK
Corresponding author:
Dr Joseph Lee, PhD (Lond), Senior lecturer in law, School of Law, University of Exeter, Stocker Rd, Exeter EX4 4PY, UK.
E-mail: j.lee@exeter.ac.uk
1. R. Meade et al., Asset Management in the UK 2017–2018: The Investment Association Annual Survey (The Investment
Association, 2018).
Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law
1–24






world after that of the United States, and overseas clients represent 40% of their business.2 The
success of this industry can be attributed to a number of factors: the tax regime, legal and financial
expertise, and the legal and regulatory framework.3 These frameworks are part of the essential
infrastructure in the development of asset management, and they aim to provide both investor
confidence and legal certainty in order that the industry can manage its legal risk.4
The asset management industry in China has developed rapidly since 2012. The total financial
value of assets under management increased from 27 trillion RMB in 2012 to 115 trillion RMB in
2016, and the average annual growth rate was 44%.5 However, the large size of the asset man-
agement market and its high growth rate does not mean that China’s asset management industry is
solid and consistent. Before the introduction of the regulations on shadow banking in 2017, many
asset management institutions in China were tools (platform providers) through which commercial
banks evaded regulatory requirements to expand their scale of credit loans.6 Many asset manage-
ment institutions were involved in risky shadow banking businesses. Asset managers promised
investors guaranteed returns, for example through rigid payment, which discouraged investors
from insisting on their right to know and influence investment decisions.7 In other words, investors
were protected by rigid payment, yet such an arrangement increased the systemic risk of the
financial market and made financial institutions inherently fragile.8
A strict regulatory regime on asset management industry was implemented in China from 2017
onwards, and rigid payment has been banned there in order to protect investors. Investor protection
has become increasingly important for the growth and stability of the industry. However, because
the financial markets in China are supervised sector by sector, there are regulatory overlaps and
gaps between the asset management vehicles governed by different Chinese authorities. There is
room for regulatory arbitrage. In addition, there is no single set of duties that apply to asset
managers, in the way that fiduciary duty is regulated in the UK. Instead, asset managers’ duties
are set out in different laws and legislation which are not always consistent. There is a need for
China’s asset management industry to unify its governing rules on asset management vehicles in
order to enhance asset managers’ accountability and investor protection.
In a global competitive market, the legal and regulatory framework is one consideration for
asset managers and clients when they decide where the legal seat and management seat for the
funds should be sited.9 The legal and regulatory framework comprises several legal sources:
private law, public regulation and other industry standards (soft law). This paper investigates the
UK legal and regulatory model through an examination of how private law (fiduciary duties and
duty of care in English common law) interacts with public regulations (the Financial Services
and Markets Act 2000 and the rules of the UK Financial Services Authority) to protect investors
and provide legal certainty to the asset management industry. As China develops its asset
2. A. Bailey (Chief Executive at the FCA), ‘Asset Management: A Regulatory Perspective’, (2018), www.fca.org.uk/news/
speeches/asset-management-regulatory-perspective.
3. H. Van Steenis, Future of Finance: Review on the Outlook for the UK Financial System, Bank of England.
4. P. Dickson, The Asset Management Review (4th edition, Law Business Research Ltd, 2015), p. 476.
5. Z. Zheng et al., Annual Report on the Development of China’s Assets Management Industry (June 2018).
6. S. Wei, ‘Wealth Management Products in the Context of China’s Shadow Banking: Systemic Risks, Consumer Pro-
tection and Regulatory Instruments’, 23 Asia Pacific Law Review (2015), p. 102.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. P. Dickson, The Asset Management Review (6th edition, Law Business Research, 2017), p. 476.
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management industry, its legal and regulatory frameworks are critical in promoting investor trust
and market confidence.10 This paper, based on a comparative law analysis, first examines the UK
model and assesses whether China can transplant the UK model, or some aspects of it, to provide
investor protection and legal certainty and thereby develop a trustworthy and independent asset
management industry.11 Thus, the paper will first discuss how UK private law, particularly fidu-
ciary duties and duty of care in English common law, deliver the two regulatory goals of investor
protection and legal certainty. It will identify some of the difficulties that arise from the UK legal
system in which there is judge-made law – common law. Further, it will show how regulatory rules
can supplement the common law duty to protect retail and consumer investors and reduce trans-
action costs by providing legal certainty.12 Specifically, we will investigate how these laws and
rules are enforced through public or private actions to show how investors can best obtain redress,
and how the authorities can maintain market confidence.
2. UK mixed model: global champion, adjusted common law, outcome-
based regulation
In English common law, asset managers owe a set of fiduciary duties and a duty of care to their
clients, whether institutional13 or retail. Fiduciary duties include the duty of loyalty, the duty to
avoid conflict of interest and the duty to act in good faith. These fiduciary duties arise out of
relationships ‘where one person acts on behalf of or for the benefit of another with a discretion or
power that affects the interests of the other’.14 The effect of fiduciary duty in equity in English
common law is to impose more stringent duties on financial services providers than contract law
would.15 Asset managers owe fiduciary duties to clients who entrust to them property or infor-
mation, and rely on their expertise to manage their investment.16 Such fiduciary duties do not
depend on the form of the investment vehicle, whether company, partnership or trust, but arise out
of the relationship. An asset manager can simply be considered an agent who searches for and
offers products in which clients can invest. They therefore owe fiduciary duties to their clients and
are covered by a range of regulations. These include: Undertakings for the Collective Investment in
Transferable Securities17 (UCITS, which facilitates the removal of restrictions on the free
10. W. Shen and S. Li, ‘Unified Supervision of New Asset Management Regulations in China: The Logic, Tools and
Boundary’, 5 Law of Finance and Economics (2019), p. 81, 108.
11. Ibid.; also see Y. Miao, ‘The Legal Characterisation of the Internal Asset Management Relationship: Looking Back and
Looking Forward’, 3 The Jurist (2018), p. 98, 112; Y. Liu and J. Lou, ‘The Asset Management Plans in Corporate
Takeovers’, 6 Tsinghua Law Review (2016), p. 71, 75; R. Huang, ‘The Legal Basis and Operational Models of Asset
Management: the US Experiences and Implications for China’, 5 Global Law Review (2019), p. 1, 15.
12. Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries, Law Com No. 350, June 2014.
13. The main corporate clients of asset management firms are pension funds, insurance companies and retail banks, who
entrust large pools of individual savings to them.
14. M. Conaglen, ‘Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due Performance of Non-Fiduciary Duties’, 5 Edinburgh Law Review
(2011), p. 320, 321.
15. ‘Discussion Paper on a Duty of Care and Potential Alternative Approaches’, FCA Discussion Paper DP18/5, July 2018,
p. 3; also see ‘A Duty of Care and Potential Alternative Approaches: Summery of Responses and Next Steps’, FCA
Feedback Statement FS19/2, April 2019.
16. Reading v. R [1949] 2 K.B. 232 at 236.
17. Directive 2009/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities.
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movement of cross-Europe mutual funds); Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive18
(AIFMD, which works to establish common requirements that govern the authorization and super-
vision of alternative investment funds); and Markets in Financial Instruments Directives19 (MIFID
II or EU laws that govern the provision of investment services in financial instruments by banks
and investment firms and the operation of traditional stock exchanges and alternative trading
venues and offer investors a high level of protection).20
An array of investment vehicles is used by asset management businesses in the UK, including
limited companies, trusts and limited partnerships. The choice of investment vehicle is influenced
by several factors, such as tax treatment and regulatory implications for the funds and the fund
managers.21 Investment vehicles are divided into three major groups: open-ended investment
vehicles, closed-ended investment vehicles and alternative investment funds. The investment
strategy of a closed-ended fund is determined by the fund’s constitutional documents or by
regulatory requirements. The most common structure that closed-ended funds use is partnership.
Unlike open-ended funds, closed-ended funds do not usually undergo constant expansion and
reduction of the number of securities in issue throughout their life.22 Alternative investment funds
(AIMs), such as hedge funds and private equity funds, are designed for smaller companies and,
because of their higher risks, are aimed at investors with an appropriate degree of knowledge and
experience.23 Open-ended funds offer lower costs, and are an easy way to pool investors’ capital
and to invest in a diversified portfolio.24 Because of this, they are the commonest investment
vehicle in the UK. Since closed-ended and alternative investment funds are designed and aimed at
specific categories of investors and are less accessible than open-ended investment funds, this
paper will mainly discuss open-ended investment funds.
A. Structure of asset management vehicles and fiduciary relations under collective
investment schemes (CIS)
1. The structure of asset management vehicles in the UK
In the UK, unit trusts and open-ended investment companies (OEIC) are the most common types of
open-ended investment funds.25 Both are mutual funds and have no restriction on the number of
18. Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2011on Alternative Investment Fund
Managers and Amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No
1095/2010.
19. Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial
instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 93/22/EEC.
20. European Commission, ‘Investment services and regulated markets – Markets in financial instruments directive
(MiFID)’, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-markets/securities-mar
kets/investment-services-and-regulated-markets-markets-financial-instruments-directive-mifid_en.
21. P. Dickson, The Asset Management Review, p. 386.
22. Ibid., p. 393.
23. ‘Alternative Investment Market: What Is It and How Does It Work?’, Daily Telegraph (2016), www.telegraph.co.uk/
investing/online-investments/alternative-investment-market-defined/.
24. London Stock Exchange, ‘Open-End Funds’, www.lseg.com/markets-products-and-services/our-markets/borsa-itali
ana/etps/open-end-funds.
25. Unit Trusts and Open-Ended Investment Companies (OEICs), (2020), www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/articles/
unit-trusts-and-open-ended-investment-companies-oeics.
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shares they can issue. Open-ended investment funds were developed from unit trusts26 and
although the trustees of unit trusts are normally financial institutions, in practice there are also
separate fund managers delegated to establish and execute the trusts’ investment strategies.27
Under English law, trusts are set up under trust deeds and cannot contract in their own name
because they do not have separate legal personality.28 Hence, trustees hold the legal titles to the
investors’ assets or property,29 rather than the unit trusts themselves holding investment assets. At
common law, trustees owe fiduciary duty directly to their beneficiaries, that is, the investors.
In contrast, OEICs are established under company law and have separate legal personality30 so
they are able to contract with investors directly, and the investors are therefore their shareholders.
As normal corporations, OEICs can raise capital and pool them to construct investment portfolios
under their own name. In terms of organization structure, OEICs are governed by the OEIC
Regulation 2001 which requires that there should be at least one FCA-approved director in an
OEIC. Approved directors are known as Authorised Corporate Directors (ACDs), and take respon-
sibility for the operation of the funds. As company directors, ACDs owe fiduciary duty to the
funds, that is, the OEICs.
In practice, although it is not obligatory, ACDs usually delegate the management of OEICs to
external investment managers.31 This is because, in a purely technical sense, OEICs are initially set
up by asset managers such as investment management companies, and at this stage the asset
managers are the sole shareholder and can appoint ACDs to deal with day-to-day operations. Once
all the shares of the OEIC have been sold to investors, the asset manager becomes an external party
to the company and therefore needs to appoint an ACD who delegates investment management
back to the asset managers who in turn manage the funds and make investment strategies through
contractual agreements on behalf of OEICs. In this way, fund managers can concentrate on
investment and hand over the daily operation of the OEIC to an ACD. Because of the separate
legal entity of OEICs, although asset management companies manage the investment assets, the
OEICs are the owners of the assets.
The significant point is that fund management and asset ownership are kept separate by this
structure and there is no direct relationship between fund managers and investors (shareholders).
As a result, the investment properties managed by OEICs are isolated from the creditors of the
asset managers. This structure also restricts the right of investors to control the managers of their
assets, thus enabling asset managers to hold multiple funds simultaneously and thereby to benefit
from the economy of scale.32 However, operating multiple funds inevitably results in conflicts of
interest because resources such as the allocation of investment opportunities and administrative
capacity are inevitably limited33 and if investors had a controlling hand, it would be difficult for
26. P. Dickson, The Asset Management Review p. 388, 392.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. The Asset Management Review, p. 387.
30. Unit Trusts and Open-Ended Investment Companies (OEICs), (2020), www.moneyadviceservice.org.uk/en/articles/
unit-trusts-and-open-ended-investment-companies-oeics.
31. P. Dickson, The Asset Management Review, p. 388, 392; Article 30 of UCITS.
32. J. Morley, ‘The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation’, 123 The
Yale Law Journal (2014): 1228, 1287.
33. Ibid.
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asset managers to hold multiple funds simultaneously. The separation of the management and
ownership of managed assets is an effective solution to this problem.
In addition, the English Law Commission clarified that the general law on fiduciary duties had
only limited application in the financial sector (a modified form of fiduciary duty).34 Financial
institutions could contractually determine the scope of their fiduciary duties subject to the reg-
ulatory principles,35 which means that conflicts of interest are allowed in the asset management
industry, subject to mandatory regulations, such as the FCA Conduct Rules in the UK and MiFID II
in the EU. As a result, some scholars have argued that general fiduciary law is not sufficient to
provide the public good of client protection through regulating conflicts of interest.36 Although
investors’ right to control their asset managers has been restricted by this structure by comparison
with shareholders’ right to influence management decisions in ordinary companies, their right of
control was compensated for by exit rights and could be traded off against the additional profits
resulting from economies of scale.37 As a type of mutual fund, the majority of OEICs allow
shareholders to redeem their shares freely at the net asset value every working day.38 To exit from
ordinary companies, on the other hand, shareholders would need to transfer their shares on the
market, rather than requesting companies to buy back their shares. In this way, allowing asset
managers to hold multiple funds can enable investment portfolios to achieve economies of scale.39
To safeguard the investment assets, an independent FCA-approved entity should be appointed by
ACDs as a custodian who holds the legal title to the OEIC’s investment property.40 In addition to
the function of safe-keeping managed assets, custodians also provide a number of ancillary ser-
vices which enhance the protection of investments on behalf of investors.41 For instance, custo-
dians may be responsible for asset valuation, compliance monitoring and performance
measurement of the investment, as well as securities lending and cash management.42
2. Fiduciary relations under the collective investment scheme (CIS)
There are two kinds of fiduciary duty related to OEICs: fund managers owe fiduciary duty to their
clients (the OEICs), and ACDs owe fiduciary duty to the OEICs. There is a contractual relationship
between OEICs and their appointed asset managers which gives rise to a fiduciary duty. The Law
Commission held the view that ‘expressed contract terms would be central to the court’s assess-
ment of the existence and scope of any fiduciary duties’.43 In the case Kelly v. Cooper44, Lord
Browne-Wilkinson held that it is necessary to have regard to the express or implied terms of
contract when deciding whether there are fiduciary relations. The court will look at the contract
34. Law Commission, ‘Fiduciary Duties and Regulatory Rules’, Law Com Consultation Paper No. 124, 1995.
35. Ibid.
36. P. Hanrahan, ‘Fiduciary Duty and the Market: Private Law and the Public Good’, University of Melbourne Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 347 (2013).
37. J. Morley, ‘The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation’, 123 The
Yale Law Journal (2014), p. 1228, 1287.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Regulation 5, OEIC Regulations.
41. Oxford Economic Research Associates, The Role of Custody in European Asset Management, European Asset
Management Association.
42. Ibid.
43. Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries, Law Com No. 350, June 2014.
44. [1993] AC 205 at 214.
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documents and FCA rules when considering fiduciary obligations.45 In English company law,
ACDs do not owe fiduciary duties to client shareholders, that is, the investors. To lift the veil of
incorporation and hold the ACDs liable to shareholders for a breach of fiduciary duty, shareholders
would need to entrust property or information to the directors46 since directors may owe fiduciary
duties if they act as an agent of shareholders when negotiating a deal on their behalf.47
3. Fiduciary relations in intermediated asset management businesses
In practice, the investment chain of asset management is normally intermediated, and although
retail investors can buy shares of funds directly from the fund management, they normally buy
shares through an agent who has ties to the manager, through online fund platforms, stockbrokers
or independent financial advisors/planners.48 Many banks and specialist brokers provide clients
with a range of options and leave it up to investors to decide which fund to invest in. Brokerage fees
are charged for the service49 and clients’ investment decisions are based on the information
provided by brokers who are responsible for providing options, rather than for assessing them and
advising whether a specific fund is suitable for their clients.50 In this situation, investors are less
likely to claim compensation if the investment turns out to be unsuitable.51 In order to enhance
investor protection, MiFID II introduced ‘appropriateness assessments’, which require financial
services providers, such as brokers and online fund platforms, to consider suitability when pro-
viding clients with direct-offer or non-advised business options. 52 Complex products should be
assessed on a case-by-case basis under such an assessment.53 However, MiFID II also identifies
certain categories of assets, such as non-structured shares or units in UCITS, as automatically non-
complex, which means that financial services providers are exempt from the requirement of having
to undertake an appropriateness assessment54 (although this exemption is not applicable to advised
or discretionary business).55 If a client makes an unsuitable investment on the advice or recom-
mendation of a broker, this may amount to financial mis-selling and the client may be eligible for
compensation. If the broker’s response to a complaint proves unsatisfactory, the Financial
Ombudsman Services may take up the client’s case for investigation.56 At English Common Law,
45. Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries, Law Com No. 350, June 2014.
46. Such as in the case Dawson International Plc v. Coats Patons Plc (1988) 4 BCC 305, the directors played the role of the
agents of shareholders to see whether the takeover bid is beneficial to the company, and therefore the court held that
directors are under a fiduciary duty to shareholders in general and in particular current shareholders with respect to the
disposal of their shares in the most advantageous way.
47. P. Dalley, ‘Shareholder (and Director) Fiduciary Duties and Shareholder Activision’, 8 Houston Business and Tax
Journal (2008), p. 301, 326.
48. The Money Advice Service, Unit Trusts and Open-Ended Investment Companies (OEICs), (2020), www.money
adviceservice.org.uk/en/articles/unit-trusts-and-open-ended-investment-companies-oeics.




52. Article 25(4)(a), MiFID II.
53. Under MiFID II, investment product manufacturers and distributors have responsibility to ensure that complex
investment products are suitable for customers investing without any advice. For detailed instructions, see ESMA,
Guidelines on MiFID II Product Governance Requirements (ESMA, 2018).
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. European Parliament, Marketing, Sale and Distribution: Mis-Selling of Financial Products, IP/A/ECON/2016-17.
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financial advisors owe a fiduciary duty to their clients which means that in an advisory business, a
financial advisor owes a fiduciary duty to investors. As Evans Lombe LJ held in the case Investors
Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society, ‘Where an adviser undertakes,
whether pursuant to a contract and for consideration or otherwise, to advise another as to its
financial affairs it is commonplace for the courts to find that the adviser has placed himself under
fiduciary obligations to that other’.57
These fiduciary duties, which arise out of the law of equity, do not include a duty of care, which
is regarded as a duty in the law of torts.58 The duty of care in tort law requires asset managers to
exercise reasonable care, skills, and diligence for their clients.59 Fiduciary duty under English
common law differs from the fiduciary duties in the US, another common law jurisdiction, where
fiduciary duties include a duty to exercise ‘professional care, skills, and diligence’.60 This differ-
ence affects not only the remedies available to claimant clients61 (tort remedies and equitable
remedies) but also how liabilities can be limited. In English common law, parties can exclude
tortious liabilities by agreement.62 This enables asset managers and clients to negotiate how risks
will be apportioned, which is a useful risk management mechanism for asset managers and for
institutional and professional investors.63 In the UK, the primary institutional clients of asset
management firms are pension funds and insurance companies. Pension funds represent 35% of
the asset management market, and insurance companies, which include in-house insurance and
third-party insurance, represent 25% of the asset management market as of 2018/19.64 The appor-
tionment of risk can affect the fees that asset managers charge and the investment strategies they
deploy for portfolios. Managers will charge higher fees if they have to take on more liability risk,
as they would need to take out insurance cover.65 They are less likely to undertake riskier invest-
ment strategies if there is a higher chance that they will be sued by institutional investors for
negligent investment.66 Because asset managers will exercise independent judgment subject to
certain contractual mandates given by the clients, it is important to allocate risks through a
definition of the scope of the fiduciary duties and duty of care in the contract or relevant docu-
ments, for example the contractual agreement between the asset managers and investment funds,
and partnership agreements or constitutions of hedge funds. Asset managers control and manage
57. Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building Society [1999] Lloyds Rep. PN 496, 509.
58. Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries, Law Com No. 350, June 2014.
59. FCA, ‘Discussion Paper on a Duty of Care and Potential Alternative Approaches’, Discussion Paper 18/5, July 2018.
60. Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal. 3rd, 644, 667.
61. Under the UK model, the nature of duty of care is tortious one and the corresponding remedies include two legal
remedies: compensation and consequential damages. If the duty of care is a part of fiduciary duty, then breach of such
duty will result it equitable remedies. Equitable remedies emphasis fairness with wider scope of remedies, including
specific performance, account of profits, equitable compensation, declaratory relief, rescission, rectification, sub-
rogation and marshalling.
62. Armitage v. Nurse [1998] Ch 241; also see Aaron Taylor, ‘Concurrent Duties’, 82 The Modern Law Review 2019, p. 17,
45.
63. B. Cheffins and J. Armour, ‘The Past, Present and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds’, 38/2011 Legal
Studies Research Paper Series (2011).
64. The Investment Association, Asset Management in the UK 2017–2018: The Investment Association Annual Survey,
The Investment Association, September 2018.
65. A. Bailey, ‘Asset Management: A Regulatory Perspective’, (2018), www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/asset-manage
ment-regulatory-perspective.
66. Such as Rubenstein v. HSBC Bank Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 1184; Lenderink-Woods v. Zurich Assurance Ltd and Others
[2016] EWHC 3287 (Ch); Zaki and Others v. Credit Suisse Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 14.
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assets, and their clients are not involved with investment decisions. Had the clients controlled their
asset funds and been able to make direct investment decisions or even dispose of assets, they may
have not been entitled to benefits such as reduction of or exemption from tax. This means that
fiduciary duties and duty of care are important tools that enable clients to hold their asset managers
accountable. It also means that clients are able to select an asset manager according to their
tolerance of risk.
The duty of loyalty may operate in a way that creates an obstacle to the development of the
asset management industry. This duty requires the fiduciary to serve only one master who is
entitled to the single-minded loyalty of their fiduciary.67 However, asset managers may need to
serve multiple clients/beneficiaries in one or multiple funds simultaneously.68 Consequently,
conflicts of interest can arise, unintentionally or incidentally, even though they are not commit-
ted by the asset managers in bad faith.69 The English court in Armitage v. Nurse did not allow the
trustee’s duty to act in good faith to be excluded, as ‘the duty of trustees to perform the trust
honestly and in good faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries (the irreducible core of a trust) is the
minimum necessary to give substance to the trust’.70 In other words, asset managers should not
act dishonestly and recklessly towards their clients.71 However, the court in this case allowed
professional trustees to exclude liability for gross negligence through exoneration clauses.
Although there has been a great deal of criticism for such a lenient approach,72 wide exoneration
clauses are still permitted under English law73 and liabilities that arise out of duty of care in tort
can be excluded by agreement.
B. Public regulation and industry guidelines
Although the allocation of risk permitted in this bargaining model at common law can deliver
benefits to both asset managers and their clients,74 it can also have a prejudicial effect on investors
such as retail investors and consumers who have substantially less bargaining power. Therefore,
such exclusionary rules or the risk allocation model should be subject to other mandatory rules to
ensure fairness, such as best execution rules and client suitability rules of the Financial Conduct
Authority (FCA).75 The EU MIFID II also imposes a duty on investment firms to act ‘honestly,
fairly, and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients’.76 In terms of regulat-
ing conflicts of interest, the EU and UK regulators have adopted a meta-regulatory approach in
which affairs are regulated by a single law and a single regulator so that financial institutions can
67. Bristol & West Building Society v. Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18, per Millett LJ.
68. J. Hawley and J. Lukomnik, ‘The Purpose of Asset Management’, Pension Insurance Corporation, March 2018.
69. A. Crockett et al., ‘Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry: What Should We Do about Them?’, Geneva
Reports on the World Economy 5 (2003).
70. [1998] Ch. 241.
71. A. Hudson, Equity and Trusts (9th edition, Routledge, 2017), p. 750.
72. For instance, in accordance with Jersey and Guernsey law, trustees are not allowed to restrict liability for gross
negligence; also see Walbrook Trustee (Jersey) Ltd and others v. Fattal and others [2009] EWCA Civ 297.
73. Dechert LLP, ‘Recent Developments in the Law Relating to Trustee Exoneration Clauses’, (2011), www.mondaq.com/
uk/Wealth-Management/151674/Recent-Developments-In-The-Law-Relating-To-Trustee-Exoneration-Clauses.
74. B. Cheffins, ‘Company Law and the Hypothetical Bargaining Model’, in Company Law – Theory, Structure and
Operation (Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 264.
75. 9.2 & 11.2 of the COBS.
76. Article 24(1), MiFID II; Article 24(2) and 19(2), MiFID II.
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easily identify, manage and disclose conflicts of interest.77 In transposing this EU law requirement,
the FCA rules also require asset managers to undertake these duties with both fiduciary and tortious
nature, and they cannot be excluded by agreement in a contract or a trust document.78 There is an
array of regulations that govern the relationships between both managers and investors and their
funds in addition to the common law fiduciary duty. For instance, MiFID and UCITS regulate the
relations between funds and investors, while AIFMD and some FCA rules, such as the best
execution rule and the client suitability rule, regulate the relationships between fund managers
and investment funds.
This risk allocation model sometimes fails to protect the ultimate beneficiaries. For instance,
asset managers also manage assets on behalf of pension funds, and in this case their direct clients
are the trustees of the pension funds, while the ultimate beneficiaries are the pension policyholders.
To close this governance gap, the UK Stewardship Code was introduced as an addition to the
mandatory rules to ensure that asset managers take a long-term view of investment when they
exercise their duties towards pension fund clients.79 Stewardship activities were defined by the
Law Commission as ‘the activities of monitoring and engaging with companies on matters such as
strategy, performance, risk, capital structure, corporate governance, culture and remuneration’.80
The duty of pension fund trustees when acting as asset managers should include stewardship of the
companies in their portfolio, and this implies exertion of influence over them.81 In other words,
trustees should devote a higher level of corporate governance to monitoring the performance of
their portfolio companies in order to benefit the pension beneficiaries in the long term.82 We can
argue that the risk allocation model created by private law should also be subject to mandatory
rules, and to the voluntary code that sets out the industry standards.
Private law can create a bargaining model in which parties can allocate risks and this model is
useful for the development of the asset management industry. Mandatory laws can be introduced
with a specific scope to protect weaker parties and raise the overall professional standards of the
sector. Voluntary codes can introduce industry standards that detail best practice. Examples are the
UK Stewardship Code, which aims to enhance the quality of engagement between investors and
companies to help improve long-term risk-adjusted returns to shareholders,83 and the Association
of Investment Companies’ Code of Corporate Governance (AIC Code), which sets out a frame-
work of best practice for the governance of investment companies.84 How these multiple legal and
regulatory tools can be coordinated to deliver the intended outcomes will depend on their enforce-
ment mechanisms which include litigation, arbitration, alternative dispute resolution (such as the
UK Financial Ombudsman Services), regulatory sanctions and market reputation.
77. Article 18, MiFID II; Articles 24, 25 & 26, MiFID Commission Directive; also see Mads Andenas and Iris Chiu, The
Foundations of Future of Financial Regulation: Governance for Responsibility (1st edition, Routledge, 2014), p. 289.
78. 2.1 of the COBS.
79. Article 1, The UK Stewardship Code.
80. Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries 2014, Law Com No. 350, June 2014.
81. A. Tilba and A. Reisberg, ‘Fiduciary Duty under the Microscope: Stewardship and the Spectrum of Pension Fund
Engagement’, 82 The Modern Law Review 2019, p. 456, 487.
82. Ibid.
83. Financial Reporting Council, ‘2012 UK Stewardship Code’, (2012), www.frc.org.uk/investors/uk-stewardship-code/
2020-uk-stewardship-code-(1).
84. The Association of Investment Companies, ‘AIC Code of Corporate Governance’, (2019), www.theaic.co.uk/aic-code-
of-corporate-governance-0.
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There are overlaps between the concept of stewardship and fiduciary duty of trustees. The court
in Cowan v. Scargill held that the discretion of trustees to make investments for the benefit of their
members and trustees is not allowed to ignore the financial interests of beneficiaries.85 On the other
hand, the Freshfields report commissioned by NUCP stated that ‘the economic power wielded by
institutional investors ought to be harnessed to meet social and environmental needs through the
wider integration of ESG considerations into investment decision-making’.86 As a result, in prac-
tice various asset managers might each have a different understanding of their fiduciary duty.87 For
instance, there is evidence that some pension fund trustees believe their fiduciary duty is to secure
the best financial interests of members, while others hold the view that their fiduciary duty should
also include non-financial interests, such as encouraging investor stewardship.88 Hence, the law
ought to clarify that the scope of fiduciary duty should not be limited to the financial interests of
fund members – beneficiaries and clients.89 Soft law initiatives can supplement private law and
provide industry guidance, while enforcement will rely on the market mechanism in ‘comply or
explain’ mode.90
3. China – the growth, shadow banking, and sectoral supervision
China’s asset management industry is very diverse and includes many shadow banking businesses
such as channel-type businesses and asset management businesses with implicit payment guaran-
tees that use the asset management name in order to avoid regulations.91 Before 2017, bank lending
was also disguised as asset management in order to evade regulatory restrictions against shadow
banking. The result has been that in China, the majority of asset management businesses were in
reality shadow banking businesses rather than traditional asset management businesses that aimed
to diversify investment and provide investment outlets.92 In addition, the various asset manage-
ment instruments, although identical in essence, were subject to different supervisory regimes
(sectoral supervision) which, although very similar, gave room for regulatory arbitrage and con-
tracting parties could select the organizing structure that suited them best. In order to make profits
through regulatory arbitrage, an increasing number of shadow banking or off-balance sheet busi-
nesses were conducted by financial intermediaries to evade regulatory requirements.93 China’s
asset management industry had become merely a tool for commercial banks to evade regulatory
restrictions before the authorities clamped down on it with a round of strict supervisions in 2018.
For example, in channel-type businesses, non-bank financial institutions, such as securities
85. [1985] Ch 270.
86. Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environmental, Social and Governance
Issues into Institutional Investment: Produced for the Asset Management Working Group of the UNCP Finance
Initiative.
87. Ibid.
88. J. Kay, The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Making, Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills, 2012.
89. Ibid.
90. Baker McKenzie, ‘The Stewardship Code 2020: Is This an Opportunity for Listed Companies to Increase Meaningful
Stakeholder Engagement?’, (2020), www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2019/11/stewardship-code-
2020.
91. S. Wei, 23 Asia Pacific Law Review (2015), p. 102.
92. S. Wei and L. Shuping, 5 Law of Finance and Economics (2019), p. 81, 108.
93. Ibid.
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companies and trust companies, lost their independent decision-making power to construct invest-
ment portfolios and make investment strategies. These institutions played the role of platform
providers for commercial banks, by conducting off-balance sheet bank lending.94 As platform
providers, non-bank financial intermediaries provided assistance to commercial banks and fol-
lowed their orders by, for example, executing orders and recording transactions, rather than
actively conducting investment activities using their own decision-making power.95
Because supervision of the financial market in China is sectoral, it is difficult to supervise off-
balance sheet businesses that are conducted by more than one financial intermediary when the
intermediaries are governed by different authorities.96 In addition, because of the nature of off-
balance sheet businesses, information about their transactions is often obscure. Before the intro-
duction of the strict supervision, most financial intermediaries conducted any shadow banking
business under the name of asset management97 which enormously increased the systemic risk of
the entire financial market. The effect of the new regulations made in 2018 was to reduce the
amount of shadow banking significantly.98 However, a side effect of cracking down on shadow
banking has been the shortage of social financing99 because, over the past decade, the shadow
banking system had provided loans to small and micro enterprises that were classified as non-
qualified borrowers for bank loans.100 As a result, there has been a sharp decrease in the year-on-
year growth rate of aggregate financing in the real economy from 12.8% in 2016 to 9.8% in
2018.101
Because of the drawbacks associated with sectoral supervision, China changed its supervisory
system for financial markets. In 2018, the banking authorities (the China Banking Regulatory
Commission, CBRC) and insurance authorities (the China Insurance Regulatory Commission,
CIRC) were merged and replaced by the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission
(CBIRC). The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is, however, still responsible for
supervision of the securities market. In addition, the Financial Stability and Development Com-
mittee was set up under the state council to coordinate sectoral supervision of the various author-
ities. Despite all this, sectoral supervision of the financial market has not been eliminated102 and
there is still the possibility of regulatory overlaps or gaps between different authorities. Sectoral
supervision is unlikely to be replaced by integrated regulation in the near future.
94. S. Guofeng, ‘China’s Shadow Banking: Bank’s Shadow and Traditional Shadow Banking’, BIS Working Papers 822
(2019).
95. Ibid.
96. S. Wei and L. Shuping, 5 Law of Finance and Economics (2019), p. 81, 108.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. ‘Total social financing refers to the aggregate volume of funds provided by China’s domestic financial system to the
private sector of the real economy within a given timeframe.’ For detailed explanations of the definition of total social
financing, see China Banking News, ‘Total Social Financing’, www.chinabankingnews.com/total-social-financing/.
Also see S. Guofeng, ‘China’s Shadow Banking: Bank’s Shadow and Traditional Shadow Banking’, Bank of
International Settlement Working Papers 822 (2019).
100. China Banking News, ‘Total Social Financing Shrinks in May as Shadow Banking Crack-Down Takes Effect’,
(2018), www.chinabankingnews.com/2018/06/13/total-social-financing-shrinks-may-shadow-banking-crackdown-
takes-effect/.
101. People’s Bank of China, Report on Aggregate Financing to the Real Economy People’s Bank of China (October
2019).
102. H. Hui, ‘The Logics and Path of China’s Financial Regulatory Structure Reform: International Experiences and Local
Choice’, 3 The Jurist (2019), p. 124, 137.
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One possible solution to sectoral supervision is to introduce fiduciary duties into China’s asset
management industry in order to unify asset managers’ duties and thereby enhance investor
protection and develop an active asset management industry. The Guiding Opinions on Regulating
the Asset Management Business of Financial Institution (the ‘Guiding Opinions)103 was intro-
duced to bring a wide range of asset management vehicles into its supervisory scope, regardless of
the supervising authority of the investment vehicle. These Guiding Opinions established the
definition and scope of asset management in an attempt to promote uniform regulatory standards
in the industry.104 Financial institutions are obliged to perform their activities with good faith,
diligence, and dutifulness for the interest of the principals105 and duties are imposed on asset
managers to protect investors and provide legal certainty.106 However, the primary aim of these
rules is to clamp down on shadow banking by restricting the use of ‘channel type businesses’ for de
facto bank lending. The measures include requirements for a decreased leverage ratio for struc-
tured finance, restrictions on the use of implicit guarantee payment, and requirements for the active
management of asset funds.107 General principles have been provided for the regulation of the
asset management industry and they grant the power to introduce specific regulations to the
People’s Bank of China and other financial regulatory departments (CSRC and CBIRC). The
CSRC has introduced mandatory rules to prevent asset management institutions from conducting
shadow banking and to limit them to conducting genuine asset management business. As an
example, the CSRC established a duty of asset managers of privately offered funds to maximize
their clients’ interest.108 In addition, the revised Securities Law 2020 states that securities com-
panies, supervised by the CSRC, that provide securities asset management services must comply
with the provision of the Securities Investment Fund Law109 in which trust law principles apply.
This means that there is now a definite statutory fiduciary duty on asset managers governed by the
CSRC.110 However, asset management institutions that are governed by CBIRC rather than the
CSRC (that is, conducted by insurance companies or subsidiaries of commercial banks) are not
under the governance of Securities Investment Fund law and therefore the trust law principles
introduced into the Securities Investment Fund Law, such as defined fiduciary duty, do not apply to
them. There is still a gap in the supervision of asset management businesses between the CSRC and
CBIRC.
103. The Guiding Opinions of the People’s Bank of China, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the
Securities Regulatory Commission, and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Regulating the Asset
Management Business of Financial Institutions, No. 106 (2018) of the People’s Bank of China.
104. Ibid., Article 2.
105. Ibid.
106. Such as ibid., Articles 5 and 22.
107. S. Wei, 23 Asia Pacific Law Review (2015), p. 102.
108. Article 3, ‘Measures for the Administration of the Privately Offered Asset Management Business of Securities and
Futures Business Institutions’, Order No. 151 of the CSRC, October 2018. Securities and futures business institutions
that carry out privately offered asset management business shall, under the principles of free will, fairness, honesty
and credibility, and maximizing the interests of clients, scrupulously perform their duties, be prudential and diligent,
protect the lawful rights and interests of investors.
109. Article 120, Securities Law 2020.
110. Article 3, ‘Securities Investment Fund Law’.
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A. Applying fiduciary duties to China’s asset management industry
At common law, fiduciary duty addresses the asymmetry of information between the fiduciary
and the beneficiary.111 It is both relational and proprietary.112 Relationships that can give rise
to fiduciary duty include those between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, teachers and
students, and professional advisers and advisees.113 Company directors owe a fiduciary duty
to the company (a legal person) as the company entrusts its property, information, and affairs
to them. When directors negotiate a deal on behalf of shareholders and provide them with
advice and recommendations, they owe a fiduciary duty to the shareholders.114 When asset
managers act on behalf of their clients, they may manage the investment for clients but do not
hold the legal titles to these assets because the law may require them to be held by custodian
banks.115 Some asset management companies only provide investment advice and access to
the funds for their clients.116 Yet in all these cases, the advisers still have fiduciary duties to
their clients, because fiduciary duties in English law do not arise solely from trust, partner-
ship, or the body corporate. As the asset management industry develops more financial
products to serve client needs,117 fiduciary duties need to cover any situation where clients
entrust their investment affairs to asset managers, regardless of the investment vehicle used.
Fiduciary duties should be incurred whenever asset managers engage in ‘investment activities’
for and on behalf of their clients.118
There is a debate about the legal nature of asset management products in China. Some scholars
argue that the asset management business is essentially a trust relationship between the financial
services provider and clients.119 In that case, trust law should not only be applied to the asset
management business of trust companies but also to that of other financial institutions such as
banks, securities, and insurance companies.120 Some essential principles in the asset management
business, such as the prohibition of payment guarantee and the fiduciary duties of the asset
manager, are typically principles of trust law.121 However, trust law explicitly stipulated that
engaging in a trust business requires a franchise licence from the China Banking and Insurance
Regulatory Commission (CBIRC). 122 In practice, the asset management plans of securities com-
panies are based on agency relationships and governed by civil law principles. However, those
asset management plans mimicked all the essential characters of their counterparts which have
111. A. Hudson, The Law of Finance (2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell), p. 94.
112. L. Rotman, ‘Understanding Fiduciary Duties and Relationship Fiduciary’, 62 McGill Law Journal (2017), p. 4.
113. Stimmel Law, ‘The Fiduciary Duty: What is It and What Does It Impose Upon You’, www.stimmel-law.com/en/
articles/fiduciary-duty-what-it-and-what-does-it-impose-upon-you.
114. C. Gerner-Beuerle and M. Schillig, Comparative Company Law (Oxford University Press, 2019), p. 469.
115. FCA, CASS6.3: Depositing Assets and Arranging for Assets to be Deposited with Third Parties, in FCA Handbook
(FCA).
116. FCA, ‘Asset Management Market Study’, Interim Report, MS 15/2, November 2016.
117. PWC, ‘Asset and Wealth Management Revolution: Embracing Exponential Change’, www.pwc.com/gx/en/asset-
management/asset-management-insights/assets/awm-revolution-full-report-final.pdf.
118. Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries, Consultation Paper No. 215, January 2014.
119. W. Yong, ‘Restructuring Underlying Legal Relationships in Asset Management Industry to Trust Relations’, 1
Tsinghua Financial Review (2018), p. 82, 84.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid; Article 25 of Trust Law.
122. Article 2 of the ‘Notice of the General Office of the State Council on Relevant Issues Concerning the Implementation
of the Trust Law of the People’s Republic of China’, No. 101 (2001) of General Office of the State Council.
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been established on trust models, such as inviting a third party’s custodianships to obtain the risk-
isolation function of trust structures.123 As discussed, asset managers only provide investment
advice and access to funds for their clients to whom they then owe fiduciary duty, even if the asset
managers and their clients are not in a trust relationship. 124 There is no jurisdiction in which the
asset management industry relies entirely on trust law to solve problems.125 The UK model shows
that common law, the Financial Services and Market Act 2000 and FCA rules together comprise
the regulations of asset management industries in addition to the contractual agreements between
parties.
In order to strike a fair balance between the development of an active asset management
industry and the need to control the systemic risks inherent in it, the scope of asset management
and its supervision needs to be relatively broad, rather than limited solely to trusts, in order to
govern the increasing number of asset management products that emerge during rapid financial
innovation.126 This means that it is unlikely for trust law to be sufficient as the sole governing law
of the asset management industry. Alternatively, the introduction of fiduciary duty into the asset
management industry could be a possible way to regulate asset managers’ behaviour and to protect
the interests of investors since fiduciary duty is not only applicable to relationships within the asset
management industry but also has the flexibility to cope with active financial innovation.
B. Transplant of English fiduciary duty law to China
Compared to that of China, the UK’s asset management industry plays an independent gatekeeping
role for corporate governance of the industry’s portfolio companies.127 It also promotes price
discovery, especially by larger institutional investors, through researching and conducting due
diligence on potential investment opportunities and diversifying their clients’ portfolios.128 In
terms of investor protection, financial services providers in the UK typically owe fiduciary duty
to their clients, and this provides solid protection to the interests of investors, together with
additional public regulations.129
The civil law-based legal system in China does not provide an equivalent concept to the
common law fiduciary duty applicable to asset managers. Asset managers’ obligations are set out
in various laws and administrative rules and, in some areas, appear to be inconsistent.130 For
instance, only the asset managers of trusts and securities investment funds owe a defined fiduciary
duty to their clients.131 The Guiding Opinions listed the obligations of asset managers in a general
manner, rather than outlining a clear fiduciary duty of asset managers.132 The General Rules of the
123. L. Yan, ‘The Structure, Function and Legal Characters of Asset Management Plans’, 3 Investors (2018), p. 4.
124. Ibid.
125. Ibid.
126. C. Gian, ‘The Contribution of the Asset Management Industry to Long-Term Growth’, 1 OECD Journal: Financial
Market Trends (2011), p. 69–78 .
127. J. Hawley and J. Lukomnik, ‘The Purpose of Asset Management’, Pension Insurance Corporation.
128. Ibid.
129. A. Hudson, The Law of Finance (2nd edition, Sweet & Maxwell), p. 113.
130. Article 8(2) of the Guiding Opinions; Article 6 of Measures for the Supervision and Administration of the Wealth
Management Business of Commercial Banks; Article 147 of Company Law and Articles 25 and 33 of Trust Law; and
Article 21, Securities Investment Fund Law.
131. Articles 25 and 33 of Trust Law; Article 21, Securities Investment Fund Law.
132. Article 8(2) of the Guiding Opinions.
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Civil Law also stipulate the principles of honesty, fairness and trustworthiness.133 For these
reasons, a wholesale transplant of the UK system to China would produce several conflicts.
In China, scholars debate whether fiduciary duties should arise solely out of trust or whether the
investment service agreement between asset managers and clients should expressly stipulate
fiduciary duties. The former is deemed to be a statutory duty as there is a specific law of trust
in China, while the latter is a contractual duty based on Chinese contract law.134 If the duty is
statutory, it is mandatory and cannot be contracted out; if it is contractual, parties have the freedom
to contract it out subject to other mandatory rules, such as the principle of good faith.135 As China
is a civil law jurisdiction, fiduciary duty is not a general duty in civil law136 so it is difficult to
identify the equivalent of fiduciary duties in Chinese civil law.
This means that relationships between managers and their clients would be regulated according
to the instruments created, such as trust and contract. Trust law is a specific type of law that can
impose a set of fiduciary duties on the trustee. For instance, under Article 25 of the Chinese Trust
Law, trustees should abide by the provision of the trust documents, and handle the trust in the
utmost interest of beneficiaries. In addition, they should fulfil their duties by carrying out their
obligation to be honest and trustworthy and by managing assets effectively. Under this article, a
trustee owes not only a set of fiduciary duties but also a duty of care. These duties cannot be
excluded, and liabilities cannot be exempted. Contractual provisions or provisions in any docu-
ment that run contrary to this would be invalid under Article 52 of the Chinese contract laws, which
stipulates that a contract clause that violates laws and administrative regulations, is invalid.
In civil law, an agent owes duties to the principal to act with honesty, trustworthiness and
fairness.137 Transplanting English fiduciary duties to Chinese law would impose an additional duty
on agents to act in the best interest of their clients. According to English law, in a partnership, each
partner owes fiduciary duties to the other partners. However, in Chinese law, partners do not owe
such duties to each other138 so the transplantation of fiduciary duty would also affect Chinese
partnership law.
As discussed, the English fiduciary duty entails several duties but does not include a duty of
care. Numerous details, such as the equitable doctrines and the relevant remedies for breach of
fiduciary duties, would be lost in the legal transplant from England to China. The introduction
of special laws through statutes or CSRC rules would be a better way of mitigating the risk of
confusion. Additionally, specific laws can clarify: (1) that the specific fiduciary duties and duty of
care apply to asset management regardless of the types of investment vehicle used; (2) which
duties and liabilities that arise from these duties can be excluded and the methods of exclusion; (3)
the mandatory rules and aims of parties that cannot be excluded by their agreement; (4) the
enforcement mechanisms that can best deliver access to justice; and (5) which bodies should
develop industry standards.
133. Articles 6 and 7 of General Rules of the Civil Law.
134. W. Yong, 1 Tsinghua Financial Review (2018), p. 82, 84; also see Liu Yan, ‘An Analysis of the Underlying Legal
Relationships of Asset Management Industry’, 4 Tsinghua Financial Review (2018), p. 25, 28.
135. Z. Lianhui, ‘Fiduciary Duties in Channel-Type Business’, (2017), www.financialnews.com.cn/trust/zjgd/201707/
t20170710_120667.html.
136. Z. Ruidong, ‘Property Right, Trust Law and Civil Code’, 3 Journal of Gansu Institute of Political Science and Law
(2007), p. 71, 75.
137. Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the General Rules of Civil Law.
138. Article 28 of Partnership Law.
16 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law XX(X)
C. A special law: a potential solution
One solution to the problem described above is to introduce a special law that both defines the asset
management industry and also lists investment activities that are considered to be asset manage-
ment activities, regardless of whether it is a trust or other asset management plan. This special law
should outline both general and specific duties without the need to specify the nature of the duty –
fiduciary duty or duty of care.
1. Fiduciary duty
The aim of fiduciary duty is to address the problem of asymmetric information. In asset manage-
ment, clients may not have all the information that asset managers have access to. Fiduciary duty
prohibits managers, by virtue of their fiduciary position, from making personal gains from the use
of this additional information. Fiduciary duties, therefore, require asset managers to disclose all
information to their clients, and if they wish to use that information for the benefit of someone
other than the client, they must obtain authorization from the client. This raises a number of
questions: what information should be disclosed; when can the asset managers use the information
to make personal gains; and how can the clients authorize conflict of interest activities conducted
by the asset managers?139 Mandatory law and regulation can provide legal certainty if they
stipulate what information must be disclosed and how clients can give authorization.140 When
clients are sophisticated investors, the information to be disclosed can be on a voluntary basis. A
set of industry standards or a voluntary code could provide the necessary guidance about what
information should be disclosed. For many retail investors, however, the disclosure of information
may not be sufficient to remove the risk of conflict of interest. The law should require either stricter
control on products and activities, such as banning risky products from being offered to investors
and investment funds (client suitability rules), or require that asset managers abide by a certain set
of professional behaviours. For example, the principle of ‘best interest of clients’ requires asset
managers to ‘establish and implement clear, effective and appropriate policies and procedures to
identify and protect vulnerable customers and not to engage in high pressure selling or carry out a
cold call in person’.141 The ‘best execution’ rule requires investment firms to ‘summarise and
make public, on an annual basis, for each class of financial instruments, the top five investment
firms in terms of trading volumes where it transmitted or placed client orders for execution in the
preceding year, and information on the quality of execution obtained when the investment firm
selects other firms to provide order execution services’.142 Under the duty to act honestly, fairly,
and professionally, a firm must act in the best interests of its clients.143
This special law regime must specify how enforcement actions can be taken to obtain redress. In
the UK, owners of investment funds, such as unit trusts and OEICs, may make a claim against asset
managers based on a breach of statutory law. Under FSMA 2000, a contravention by an authorized
person of an FCA rule is actionable at the suit of a private person who suffers loss as a result of the
139. Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries, Consultation Paper No. 215, January 2014.
140. PWC, ‘Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II – Level 2: ESMA’s Technical Advice to the Commission on
MiFID II and MiFIR’, www.pwc.lu/en/mifid/docs/pwc-markets-in-financial-instruments-directive-2-mifid-2-level-2.
pdf.
141. 2.1.2, 2.1.2, 2.1.4 and 2.1.5 of the CMCOB.
142. 11.2 A of the COBS.
143. 2.1.1 of the COBS.
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contravention, although there are some exceptions.144 This has proved to be a burdensome route
for retail investors, as the legal costs can be enormous. According to the Lord Chief Justice’s
annual report to parliament, civil justice is unaffordable to most people in the UK145 and the
expense of high court (tribunal) fees and legal advice have prevented individuals from pursuing
litigation.146 The UK’s Financial Services Ombudsman provides access to an alternative mechan-
ism for dispute resolution for retail investors or customers to obtain redress through, for example,
compensation. China could set up a similar body to help retail investors gain access to justice and
protection. The special law should specify whether breaches of these rules would give rise to
private action.
2. Duty of care
Duty of care requires asset managers to exercise due care, diligence, and skills in managing
investment affairs.147 However, the way in which asset managers ought to behave depends on
what can reasonably be expected of an asset manager.148 In the UK, the standard is not defined as
the way in which the majority of managers would have behaved, but instead whether ‘any rea-
sonable manager would have acted in such a way’.149 Hence, the common law standard is rather
low and financial regulators have recognized the inadequacy of common law principles to provide
protection for investors.150 Hence, the FCA Handbook provides more detailed rules that set out the
business conduct standards with which asset managers should comply, such as duty to act in the
best interests of clients, duty to act with integrity, and the best execution rule.151 Breaches of these
standard rules do not, per se, amount to a breach of duty of care152 but retail investors may be able
to obtain redress for mis-selling investment products by financial services providers through the
Financial Services Ombudsman. In addition, investment funds, such as OEICs, are able to receive
compensation for asset managers’ breach of FCA rules. To obtain court redress, these conduct
rules may provide some guidance to the courts, but they are not definitive statements of the
standard of care required by asset managers.153 The lesson we must draw from the UK’s model
is that a rigid standard of care increases the likelihood of litigation in the courts. The FCA sets out
industry standards for the good conduct of business in its handbook, and falling short of these
standards would result in regulatory sanctions as well giving clients cause for complaint to the
144. In accordance with 138D (2) of the FSMA 2000. ‘A contravention by an authorised person of a rule made by the FCA
is actionable at the suit of a private person who suffers loss as a result of the contravention, subject to the defences and
other incidents applying to actions for breach of statutory duty.’ However, this clause is not applicable to authorized
person’s breach of rules of conduct under section 64A of FSMA 2000.
145. Judiciary of England and Wales, The Lord Chief Justice’s Report 2015 (Judicial Office, 2015).
146. The Bach Commission on Access to Justice, The Crisis in the Justice System in England and Wales, Interim Report,
November 2016.
147. FCA, A Duty of Care and Potential Alternative Approaches: Summary of Responses and Next Steps, FCA Feedback
Statement FS19/2, April 2019.
148. FCA, Asset Management Market Study Remedies and Changes to the Handbook – Feedback and Final Rules to CP
17/18, Policy Statement PS 18/8, April 2018.
149. Speight v. Gaunt (1833) UKHL 1; Re Waterman’s Will Trusts [1952] 2 All ER 1054; Barlett v. Barclay Bank Trust Ltd
(No. 1) [1980] Ch. 515.
150. Law Commission, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries, Law Com No 350, June 2014.
151. Chapter 2 of the COBS.
152. FCA, A Duty of Care and Potential Alternative Approaches: Summery of Responses and Next Steps, FCA Feedback
Statement FS19/2, April 2019.
153. PERG 8.1 of the FCA Handbook.
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FOS. The decisions of the FOS are not published, and it decides cases with high efficiency and
quality,154 so the FOS is able to resolve most complaints within three months of the case handler
getting in touch with clients. In 2018/19, 63% of people in the UK were satisfied with FOS
services, 76% of the public trust FOS and 79% of business respondents had confidence in FOS.155
FOS also has a cost advantage compared with litigation fees: clients do not need to pay a case fee
for their first 25 complaints. From the 26th complaint onwards, FOS charges a case fee of GBP
550.156 If clients accept the ombudsman’s decision, the business must comply with that decision.
However, if clients do not want to accept the ombudsman’s decision, they may still be able to take
legal action against the business although the FOS would not be involved in the court proceedings.
As mentioned previously, breaches of the industry standards set out in the FCA’s handbook would
not necessarily be a breach of the standard of care that would result in the courts awarding damages
to the claimant. In this way, the US style of class action can be avoided, especially when the
fiduciary duty in the US also includes the duty of care.
The translation and interpretation of the common law duty of care into Chinese civil law is a
task which is far from straightforward, but European standards for asset management could
provide a blueprint for how these standards of care for asset management can be embraced by
both common law and civil law jurisdictions. Any special law created for asset management should
include specific duties with which asset managers should comply. To avoid conflicts between this
special law and the general principle of civil law, the specific duties could be created in such a way
that the law would only provide regulatory sanctions or enable investors to claim compensation
through an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. This would remove the risk of class action
lawsuits against funds or host institutions, which could be detrimental to the development of the
industry.
3. Raising industry standards
The UK’s FCA introduced a Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SMCR) to hold individ-
uals accountable for breaching the rules intended to raise the standards of the asset management
industry.157 Asset managers need to comply with a number of prescribed duties and will also be
responsible for any breach of these rules by their employees if they fail to take reasonable steps to
prevent the risks.158 The SMCR increases the individual costs for senior managers in the asset
management industry159 but it also sets standards for financial services providers that are higher
than the common law rules.160 It not only aims to encourage asset managers to take personal
responsibility for their actions, but also to ensure that financial firms and their staff clearly
understand and live up to their responsibilities.161 If there is a breach of SMCR rules, FCA
154. E. Kempson, S. Collard and N. Moore, ‘Fair and Reasonable: An Assessment of the Financial Ombudsman Service’,
Personal Finance Research Centre, University of Bristol.
155. Financial Ombudsman, Financial Ombudsman Services Annual Review 2018/2019, Financial Ombudsman.
156. Ibid.
157. FCA, Extending the Senior Manager & Certification Regime to FCA Firms – Feedback to CP 17/25 and CP 17/40,
and Near-Final Rules, Policy Statement PS 18/14, July 2018.
158. FCA, The Senior Managers and Certification Regime: Guide for FCA Solo-Regulated Firms, July 2019.
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investigations and disciplinary action will follow. For instance, Tullett Prebon (Europe) Limited
was fined £15.4m by the FCA because of its inadequate risk management systems, its failure to be
open and cooperative with the FCA, and its failure to conduct its businesses with due skill, care and
diligence between 2008 and 2010.162
While private law may be an effective way to raise professional standards (such as the US style
of class action), private enforcement can be costly and clients may not have the means or incentive
to bring suits against financial institutions that are better able to defend themselves against claims.
Under the UK model, the FCA has the direct power to monitor firms’ activities and require them to
submit a statement to demonstrate how they are living up to their responsibilities. Firms need to set
up rigorous internal compliance systems to cover issues such as training, and to ensure that their
employees at all levels comply with the standard.
Because SMCR is merely the FCA’s set of rules of conduct for employees of relevant autho-
rized persons,163 created in order to advance the operational objectives of the FCA, and is not a
statutory law,164 a breach of SMCR rules does not give rise to client action for damages in
accordance with FSMA 2000.165 There has been intensive discussion about the consequence of
breaching these rules.166 Intensive lobbying from the industry may be one reason for the lack of
private enforcement power; another practical reason is that the conduct rules are subject to
change.167 Regulators need to take time to write the rules, the industry requires time to implement
them, and then the regulators need to learn from experience in the application of the rules before
making improvements. Allowing breaches of the rules to trigger private actions in the courts makes
reform of the rules more difficult. Because some of the conduct rules are designed not only to
protect investors but also to reinforce market integrity and market competition, it is not possible to
stipulate the objective of each rule.
4. Recommendation
China is in the process of developing its capital market under its open reform programme and
should gradually open this sector to more competition. Asset management is an important sector
that can help distribute investment power that was previously more centralized. It can provide
additional investment outlets and financial products to consumers, and thereby create an indepen-
dent asset management sector that can act as a corporate monitoring mechanism. However, asset
management is and has been used in China for shadow-banking, which creates financial instabil-
ity.168 The current asset management industry in China does not exist to help institutional investors
diversify investment risks;169 providing investment outlets and additional products to retail
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Consultation Papers CP 17/25 and CP 17/26, July 2017.
167. S. Leslie, ‘SMCR Practical Steps: Conduct Rules, Employment Contracts, Policies’, www.xperthr.co.uk/legal-gui
dance/smcr-practical-steps-conduct-rules-employment-contracts-policies/164729/.
168. S. Wei, 23 Asia Pacific Law Review (2015), p. 102.
169. UBS, ‘UBS Asset Management Launches Debut China Onshore Multi Asset Private Fund’, (2019), www.ubs.com/
global/en/media/display-page-ndp/en-20191024-multi-asset-private-fund.html.
20 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law XX(X)
investors and consumers has not been its core business.170 We have argued that reliance on private
law alone does not provide investor confidence and in China, fiduciary duty is only imposed on
those asset managers who use trust as the legal vehicle to manage client assets. Investors do not
benefit from the protection of fiduciary duty when other types of asset management vehicles such
as agency relationships are used. Since the provision of trust services in China is limited to trust
companies, many investors use agency as a mechanism to circumvent this restriction for invest-
ment firms to manage their assets. This creates a protection gap for investors because there is no
fiduciary duty under the law of agency.
In China, the protection given to investors by fiduciary duty is especially important when asset
managers are prohibited from promising an expected (fixed and guaranteed) return to investors,
that is, rigid payment. Before the introduction of the Guiding Opinions, the asset management
industry often provided rigid payment to their clients, and investors were unlikely to insist on
their right to know or to influence the investment strategy applied by asset managers. Even if
the investment was unsuccessful, when guaranteed payments were allowed investors still
received the agreed investment return which meant that fiduciary duty was of little impor-
tance. However, asset management businesses have normally been off-balance sheet activities
with no capital reserve requirement for possible losses and no ‘lender of last resort’ protection
from the Central Bank. When payment is guaranteed to investors, financial institutions make
their profit through the difference between the guaranteed payments to investors and the
actual investment returns, rather than through commission fees or carried interests (perfor-
mance fees). In reality, asset management businesses which guaranteed payment were lend-
ing, but it was disguised under another name. These shadow banking businesses created
systemic risk for financial institutions because any shadow banking system is inherently
fragile171 since it lacks the protective measures that are applied to normal bank lending.
As a result, the expansion of asset management businesses meant that there was an increasing
systemic risk until eventually rigid payment was banned by the Guiding Opinions. Without
the protection provided by guaranteed payments, fiduciary duty becomes increasingly impor-
tant to investors because of the information asymmetry and the difference in bargaining power
between financial services providers and investors.
In recent years, China has been active in the introduction of the EU style of regulation to provide
protection to investors. The duty of avoiding conflict of interest, the suitability rules, due care and
diligence, and best execution rules have all been introduced in order to provide more protection to
investors.172 For instance, the revised Securities Law 2020, which came into force on 1 March
2020, introduced ‘the suitability rule’ and transplanted Chinese-style class actions from the inves-
tor protection model of Taiwan.173 Investors are able to bring a legal action to the court to claim
compensation on the basis of asset managers’ breach of the suitability rule, and the basic principles
as set out in various laws. The main basis for claims is provided by, for example, the Contract Law,
the Securities Law, the Securities Investment Fund Law, the Trust Law and the normative
170. European Commission, Distribution Systems of Retail Investment Products Across the European Union (European
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171. K. Hachem, ‘Shadow Banking in China’, 10 Annual Review of Financial Economics (2018), p. 287.
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document issued by the State Council.174 In addition, the Supreme People’s Court has clarified that
departmental rules, such as the Guiding Opinions, or the CSRC and CBIRC rules, can also be
applied by the court to decide whether or not asset managers have breached the suitability rule. UK
law provides for private action against breaches of public regulations such as the FCA public
rules175 but reliance on the courts to provide redress is slow and costly176 so, as in the UK, China
should establish a Financial Services Ombudsman to provide expedient dispute resolution mechan-
isms for investors.
It is not, however, necessary for China to revise its civil law to provide protection to investors in
asset management. In English law, as noted above, fiduciary duty has a very broad scope of
application that can conflict with civil law jurisdiction. Lawmakers in China therefore need to
introduce specific rules that close the asymmetric information gap when asset managers exercise
their duties. These specific duties can be outlined in public regulations. In English law, some of the
fiduciary duties can be contracted out or limited by way of approval or authorization; these can also
be specifically stated in public regulations. One difference between English law and the US
common law approach to fiduciary duty lies in the duty of care: whether asset managers must
exercise due care and diligence in exercising fiduciary duty. In English law, such a tortious duty
can be limited by agreement but in the US, it is part of the fiduciary duty and some states, such as
Delaware, allow parties to contract out fiduciary duties in the operating agreement,177 while in
others, such as Arkansas, the duty of loyalty may not be eliminated and duty of care may not be
unreasonably reduced.178 It is possible for public regulations to state clearly whether the duty to
exercise due care and skill can be contracted out and what remedies are available for any breach. In
the UK, the standards of care are set by public regulations such as the FCA conduct rules. Chinese
policy makers can decide how to set the standards of conduct in the asset management industry and
state clearly whether a breach of these industry standards will result in a breach of duty of care.179
Some flexibility is needed in the way they set and address industry standards. Since the market is
developing rapidly, the codification of standards into civil law would make the rules rigid and
inflexible. Furthermore, as the courts may not be familiar with the operations and expectations of
the industry, their rulings can have an adverse impact on market development.180 For the protec-
tion of institutional investors, there can also be soft law, such as the UK Stewardship Code,181 to
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provide voluntary industry standards for asset managers to exercise their governance rights in the
invested companies for the benefits of their clients.
The collective investment vehicles, such as securities investment funds, collective trust plans
and collective asset management plans that are widely applied in China, do not have separate legal
personality182 which means that under such vehicles, there is a direct relationship between inves-
tors and asset managers. As a result, under China’s model the advantages of the separated model
mentioned in 2.1, such as benefits from economies of scale cannot benefit investors. The separate
legal personality of certain collective investment vehicles should be admitted by law in order to
develop an active asset management industry and to enhance investor protection.183
5. Conclusion
The UK legal and regulatory model for investor protection in asset management consists of private
law, public regulation and industry guidelines. Private law can create a bargaining model in which
parties can allocate risks through contractual negotiation. This model is useful for the development
of the asset management industry. Public regulation can be introduced with a specific scope to
protect weaker parties and to raise the overall professional standards of the sector. Voluntary codes
can improve industry standards and detail best practice. Under the UK model, private law sets out
the minimum standards of asset managers’ duties, and public regulation establishes higher industry
standards and provide different modes of enforcement mechanisms for redress, such as the Finan-
cial Services Ombudsman. There is also soft law in the form of industry standards such as the
Stewardship Code and the AIC code that emphasize good industry practice.
In addition to private law, public regulation also governs the asset management industry under
the UK model. EU laws, such as MIFID II, UCITS and AIFMD have been transposed and
integrated into the UK model, and these impose higher standards of duty for asset managers to
protect weaker parties and maintain market integrity. For example, FSMA 2000 introduced the
non-exclusive fiduciary obligations for scheme managers of UCITS funds. The FCA’s Conduct of
Business Rules, which it enforces, also set higher standards including the best execution rule, the
principle of best interests of clients, the duty to act with integrity and fairly towards the clients, and
the duty to cooperate with the FCA. However, a breach of FCA rules by fund managers does not
automatically trigger private action. Alternatively, the FOS, established by parliament, decides
cases by official experts with high efficiency and resolves disputes in the financial service sector
without lengthy and expensive court litigation. To hold individuals accountable for breaching
rules, the FCA introduced SMCR, which aims to raise the standards of the asset management
industry.
China’s asset management industry has been criticized for its lack of independence, insufficient
investor protection, and potentially higher systemic risks. This paper has shown that the English
model of investor protection in the asset management industry can offer lessons to China. First, the
duties of asset managers in China are set out in various laws and administrative regulations, which
are inconsistent in some areas. In the UK, the specific fiduciary duty and duty of care apply to asset
management regardless of the type of investment vehicle used. Hence, the introduction of a UK-
style fiduciary duty scheme into the asset management industry can unify the duties of asset
182. R. Huang, 5 Global Law Review (2019), p. 1, 14.
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managers to provide identical protections to investors. Secondly, the UK model identifies circum-
stances in which duties of asset managers can be excluded by contractual agreements, along with
the methods of exclusion, in order to promote the development of the asset management industry,
but it also offers protections to the party with a weaker bargaining position through non-excludable
duties in mandatory rules. China can also learn from this model how to strike a fair balance
between the development of the asset management industry and the protection of investors through
the introduction of a special law. Thirdly, collective investment vehicles do not have separate legal
personalities under China’s current model and as a result, the UK-style separated structure of
investment vehicles cannot be applied. Hence, we suggest that the separate legal personality of
certain investment vehicles should be admitted by laws. Fourthly, the enforcement mechanisms
under the UK model can give access to justice, while soft law (industry guidelines) can help
establish industry standards. Because of the unequal bargaining position between investors and
asset managers brought about by information asymmetry, the principles of fairness, trustworthi-
ness, and equality in China’s contract law are not adequate to protect investors and alternative
mechanisms for dispute resolution, such as the UK’s FOS, may provide an efficient resolution to
address the imbalance.
A wholesale legal transplant of the UK model into China is not likely to provide legal stability
because it would affect a number of relationships under the civil law system. It would also be
difficult to reconcile with some existing civil law principles in China, such as the principles of
fairness, trustworthiness and equality. Instead, the introduction of a special law for the asset
management industry that details general and specific duties is a more realistic approach. Current
regulations, such as trust law and the Guiding Opinions, have already provided a list of duties for
asset managers but they are set out in several regulations and are not consistent. The introduction of
a fiduciary duty regime into the asset management industry in China through a special law could
unify the duties of financial services providers in different sectors of the asset management
industry, and also avoid difficulties of reconciliation with existing civil law principles.
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